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Western Melanesian parliaments2 are routinely charac-
terised as revolving door, with roughly half (and some-
times more) of the sitting members losing their seats 
at each election, so that at any one time a large propor-
tion of members are first-termers. This phenomenon 
is generally attributed to weak political party organisa-
tion, the contest between large numbers of candidates 
for local constituencies, electoral systems that deliver 
local victories with a minority of votes, and unachiev-
able compacts between constituents and elected mem-
bers for direct benefits in return for electoral support 
(Fraenkel 2005; Morgan 2005; Woods 2014). These 
factors are not at work in Timor-Leste, yet the turno-
ver of members after each election is even higher: 79.5 
per cent in 2007 and 61.5 per cent in 2012. The analy-
sis developed in this In Brief identifies several contrib-
utory factors, and reflects on the implications of the 
high turnover for parliamentary effectiveness.
The central elements of Timor-Leste’s electoral 
system were devised during the period of the UN 
peacekeeping mission that administered the territory 
in the transition from the withdrawal of Portuguese 
and Indonesian territorial claims in October 1999 to 
independence in May 2002. An immediate priority 
in the transition period was to develop a constitution 
for the new ‘state-in-waiting’, and the decision was 
taken to elect a constituent assembly to draft the text. 
A hybrid electoral system was adopted: 75 members 
were elected on the basis of a single national constitu-
ency with voters choosing a party from closed party 
lists3; and 13 members were elected in district constit-
uencies (one member for each of the 13 districts). 
A transitional provision of the constitution4  
(Section 167) provided for the Constituent Assembly 
to morph into the first parliament at independence. 
Section 93 of the constitution set the size of future par-
liaments at between 52 and 65 members, and provided 
for the details of the electoral system such as constitu-
encies and electoral procedures to be determined by 
legislation. The electoral law made in December 2006 
fixed the number of parliamentary members at 65. It 
retained the electoral system of closed party lists, but 
excluded any mechanism for independent candidates 
to stand. It also established the single national constit-
uency as the exclusive basis for election, abandoning 
district constituencies altogether.5
In all, three national elections have been held in 
Timor-Leste: the first in August 2001 to select the Con-
stituent Assembly, the second in June 2007, and the third 
in July 2012. In each successive election, the number of 
political parties represented in the parliament has fallen. 
The members elected to the Constituent Assembly in 
2001 were drawn from twelve political parties as well 
as one independent. This was a matter of some pride to 
the UN Transitional Administration, which was actively 
pursuing a pluralist assembly. Nonetheless, one political 
party — FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste 
Independente) — which had marketed itself as the party 
of the independence struggle, emerged the clear winner 
with a comfortable margin of 62.5 per cent of the seats. 
The 2007 election was held in turbulent times: the 
FRETILIN prime minister had been forced to resign 12 
months earlier, at a time when extreme violence con-
vulsed the capital, and the situation remained fragile. In 
the lead-up to the 2007 election, the massively popular 
president, Xanana Gusmão, stepped down from office 
and formed a new political party — CNRT (Congresso 
Nacional de Reconstrução de Timor-Leste) — in order 
to contest the parliamentary election and thus pursue 
the prime ministership. Seven parties or coalitions of 
parties6 won more than the necessary three per cent 
minimum vote share for election to the parliament. 
FRETILIN won the single largest share of the vote, but 
not an outright majority, and government was formed 
by a coalition of other parties led by CNRT. In the 2012 
election, only four parties were elected to the parlia-
ment, although a record 20 parties and one coalition 
of two parties stood for election. CNRT again formed 
a post-election coalition to achieve a majority. 
While the electoral system puts the focus on 
parties, it is intriguing to observe what is happening 
at the level of individual members. Only 21.1 per cent 
of the members ever elected to the parliament have 
served for more than one term, and the majority of 
these have only served for two terms; only 3.4 per cent 
of members ever elected have lasted the distance for 
three terms. Of those elected for more than one term, 
six individuals (16.2 per cent) changed political party 
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in the lead-up to their re-election. Significantly, all but 
one of them switched from another party to CNRT. 
This high turnover of members appears counter-
intuitive, given the closed party list electoral system7 
and the incidence of members switching to the most 
popular party. What, then, is going on?
The reduction in size of the parliament from 88 
in 2001 to 65 in 2007 does not explain why only 18 
members from the first parliament were re-elected in 
2007. The formation of the vote-winning CNRT party 
and the squeezing out of other political parties from 
re-election account for only some of the turnover. Simi-
larly, the further reduction in the number of successful 
parties in 2012 is insufficient to explain why only 25 
members were re-elected. Another possible element in 
the mix is the requirement that members of parliament 
who are appointed to the executive resign their seat, 
but the impact, if any, would be slight.   
A significant part of the turnover would seem to 
be explained by the decisions of individual members 
of parliament not to contest the next election, or the 
decisions of their political parties not to relist them. At 
first blush, this appears an improbable explanation for 
the numbers involved: why would an individual sac-
rifice the status and job satisfaction of parliamentary 
membership, and why would parties continually turn 
over experienced members if they want to maximise 
their effectiveness on the floor of the parliament and 
in its committees? The controversial policy of provid-
ing pensions at the level of full parliamentary salary for 
members of parliament who have served for a mini-
mum of 42 months8 may be a factor here. A turnover of 
members is, anecdotally, a way of extending benefits to 
a larger number of party loyalists. In effect, unrenewed 
parliamentary terms distributed to party members 
offer a valued source of party patronage in a politi-
cal system in which the state is the primary source of 
access to resources. The parliamentary pension scheme 
has recently attracted public criticism from advocacy 
groups9 and the church,10 although Deputy Prime Min-
ister Lasama de Araujo has defended it as providing for 
Timorese who have dedicated themselves to the state.11 
Whatever the reasons — structural or individual — 
for the high parliamentary turnover, the consequence 
is that with the formation of each new parliament, a 
largely new cohort of members has to learn the busi-
ness from scratch, compromising the effectiveness of 
the parliament in the exercise of its legislative, oversight 
and political decision-making powers.12 
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Endnotes
1 The lists of members of parliament for 2002–07, 
2007–12 and 2012– on which this analysis draws can 
be found on the website of Timor-Leste’s parliament. 
2 The parliaments of Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu.
3 Provision was also made for independent candidates. 
See UNTAET/REG/2001/2, On the Election of a 
Constituent Assembly to Prepare a Constitution for an 
Independent and Democratic East Timor. Section 34. 
4 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.
5 Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Law No. 6/2006, Law 
on the Election of the National Parliament. Articles 9, 10 & 11. 
6 Five parties were elected in their own right; in addition, 
a coalition of two parties and a coalition of three parties 
were elected. 
7 In a closed list electoral system, voters elect parties rather 
than individuals, so voter dissatisfaction with particular 
members of parliament is generally unlikely to account 
for their non-election in the next parliamentary term.
8 Retiring members, while retaining their salary, lose 
generous allowances. See Democratic Republic of Timor-
Leste. National Parliament. Law 5/2004, The Status of 
Members of Parliament, Article 22; and Law 01/2007, 
Monthly Life Pension and Other Privileges for Former 
Members of Parliament. 
9  Televizaun Timor-Leste, 30/4/2014.
10  Suara Timor Lorosae, 4/6/2014.
11  Suara Timor Lorosae, 30/5/2014.
12 These are the functions of the parliament as listed in 
Section 92 of the constitution. 
